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The dispute that resulted in the secession of eleven Southern states from the Union and the ensuing
Civil War proximately concerned the geographical expansion of slavery, but ultimately bore on the
existence of the institution of slavery itself. This paper asks why in 1861 after seventy years of artful
compromises over slavery civil conflict became unavoidable. The paper seeks an answer that goes
beyond a description of the breakdown of compromises based on existing constitutional
arrangements and that explains why attempts to negotiate a new constitutional compromise failed.
Combining theoretical and historical analysis the paper concludes that in the years leading up to
1861 the outcome of the dispute over slavery had become too important to both Northern and







herschel_grossman@brown.eduFrom the beginning of the American republic Northern and Southern interests were at
odds over the institution of slavery. Although the politics of slavery focused mainly on
the issue of geographical limitations on the property rights of slave owners – speciﬁcally
on whether slavery was to be permitted in the western territories that were preparing for
statehood – the dispute ultimately bore on the existence of the institution of slavery it-
self. Remarkably, for the ﬁrst seventy years of the republic artful compromises enabled the
dispute over slavery to be settled peacefully.1 These compromises incorporated a critical
understanding that the Constitution allowed the individual states to determine the property
rights of slave owners.2
As Barry Weingast (1998, pages 167-168) points out, “Because the country was growing,
each new generation had to renew the arrangements that began when the founding fathers
created a system with strong constitutional protection for slavery.” In 1861, however, com-
promises based on existing constitutional arrangements broke down, and all attempts to
negotiate a new constitutional compromise failed. Events culminated in the secession of
eleven Southern states from the Union and the ensuing war for independence of the Con-
federate States of America from the United States of America. This war, usually called the
American Civil War, remains by any measure the bloodiest war in American history. In
1Focusing on the issue of slavery is a simpliﬁcation. As Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch (2001) explain,
Northern and Southern interests diverged over a variety of issues, including banking policy, tariﬀs, and public
works as well as slavery. But Ransom and Sutch admit (page 288) that “the long-term fear behind Southern
advocacy of states rights was unquestionably a defense of slavery”. James McPherson (2001) debunks the
claim that the main Southern interest was not in defending slavery, but in “a noble cause, the cause of state
rights, constitutional liberty, and consent of the governed.” According to McPherson, “... most professional
historians have come to agree with Lincoln’s assertion that slavery ‘was, somehow, the cause of the [Civil]
war’.”
2This understanding largely shielded national politics from the issue of slavery. Prior to the establishment
in 1854 of the Republican Party, the main political parties, Whigs and Democrats, had national constituen-
cies, and the sectionally divisive issue of slavery was not central in the competition between the parties.
1the poignant words of the historian David Potter (1976, page 583) summarizing the conse-
quences of the war, “Slavery was dead; secession was dead; and six hundred thousand men
were dead.”
Why Secession and War? The Received Answer
Why did the issue of slavery eventually result in civil conﬂict? I take the received answer,
my account of which is largely based on Robert Fogel (1989), McPherson (1988, 2001), Potter
(1976), and Weingast (1998), to involve three main elements:
First, by the middle of the nineteenth century, as Potter (1976, page 93) explains, “The
longstanding sectional equilibrium within the Union was disappearing and the South was
declining into a minority status, outnumbered in population, long since outnumbered and
outvoted in the House, and protected only by balance in the Senate.” But, neither the
Compromise of 1850, which admitted California to the Union as a free state, while allowing
settlers in New Mexico and Utah to decide, under the principle of “squatter sovereignty”,
whether these territories should become free or slave states, nor the Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1854, which organized the Kansas and Nebraska Territories under the principle of squatter
sovereignty, resulted in the admission of additional slave states, as maintaining balance in
the Senate would have required. In addition, as Potter (1976, page 93) stresses, “There
was not one slave territory waiting to be converted into another slave state, while all of
the upper part of the Louisiana Purchase, all of the Oregon territory, and now all of the
Mexican Cession stood ready to spawn free states in profusion.” With their failure to gain
admittance of Kansas as a slave state it was clear that Southern interests had permanently
lost the protection of balance in the Senate.
Second, prior to the election of 1860 every President has been either a Southerner or
a Northerner who had signiﬁcant Southern support. But, by 1860 more rapid population
growth in the North than in the South allowed Abraham Lincoln, the candidate of the
recently formed Republican Party, to be elected without carrying any Southern state. This
2event meant that Southern interests also had lost the protection of the Presidential veto.
Third, the free-soil platform of the Republican Party, which called for the prohibition
of slavery in the territories, implied a new understanding about the prerogatives of winners
of national elections under the Constitution. Although the Republican platform did not
mention emancipation, the platform in eﬀect rescinded the understanding that the Consti-
tution allowed the individual states to determine the property rights of slave owners.3 The
new president, Lincoln, as quoted by Potter (1976, page 427) and McPherson (1988, page
179), had denounced slavery as “morally wrong”, had stated that “this government cannot
endure, permanently half slave and half free”, and had expressed his hope for the “ultimate
extinction” of slavery. According to Fogel (1989, page 381), the Republicans were “deter-
mined to restrict slavery’s political and economic domination to guarantee that the federal
government promoted northern interests and principles.”
On the Southern side, according to McPherson (2001), “Jeﬀerson Davis...justiﬁed seces-
sion as an act of self-defense against the incoming Lincoln administration, whose policy of
excluding slavery from the territories would make ‘property in slaves so insecure as to be
comparatively worthless,...thereby annihilating in eﬀect property worth thousands of mil-
lions of dollars’.” According to this account Southern secessionists were reacting both to
demographic developments and to the proactive stance of the Republican Party in rescinding
an understanding that limited the prerogatives of the winners of national elections under
the Constitution.
Why Secession and War? A Deeper Question
The problem with this received answer is that it does not go far enough. Speciﬁcally,
although the received answer describes the breakdown of compromises based on existing con-
3Weingast (1998) argues that this understanding depended on balance in the Senate and, hence, that the
rescinding of this understanding was not an independent development, but rather a result of the increasing
dominance of Northern interests in national elections.
3stitutional arrangements, it does not explain why attempts to negotiate new constitutional
compromises failed. Certainly, there were many ideas for new constitutional arrangements in
the air. Moreover, given their experience in devising compromises, Northern and Southern
interests should have been capable of realizing such ideas, if they were feasible.
One idea, which would have changed the nature of national elections to reverse the
increasing political dominance of Northern interests, was to reconstitute the Union as a
federation of the set of Northern states and the set of Southern states. In his proposal for a
“concurrent majority”, the Southern politician John C. Calhoun envisaged a dual presidency,
with one president representing the North and one representing in the South, and each with
the power to veto legislation. Of course, such a reform proposal had no chance, as Northern
interests, having worked hard to destroy sectional balance in the Senate, would hardly be
willing to accept a sectionally balanced presidency.
Other ideas would have constructed a new understanding limiting the prerogatives of
Northern interests, as the likely winner of future national elections under the Constitution.
One possibility would have been to agree to rule out any policy more extreme than the
British example of emancipation with compensation. But, Fogel (1989, page 412) tells us
that “whatever the opportunity for a peaceful abolition of slavery before 1845, it surely
was nonexistent after that date. To Southern slaveholders, West Indian emancipation was
a complete failure...They could see plainly that the economy of the West Indies was in
shambles, that the personal fortunes of the West Indian planters had collapsed, and that
assurances made to these planters in 1833 to obtain their acquiescence to compensated
emancipation were violated as soon as the planters were reduced to political impotency.”
The proposed Crittenden Compromise, perhaps the most serious of several futile at-
tempts to amend the Constitution in order to prevent civil conﬂict, embodied another set of
possibilities for limiting the prerogatives of Northern interests. The Crittenden Compromise,
formally introduced in Congress in December 1860, would have given explicit constitutional
protection to slavery in those states, and in the District of Columbia, where slavery already
4existed and in those remaining territories in which slavery was to be allowed according to
the Missouri Compromise of 1820.
Both Northern and Southern interests rejected this compromise. The Republicans, led
by President-elect Lincoln, would not accept any scheme that infringed on the free-soil plank
of their platform. And, according to Fogel (1989, page 413), the Southerners by then “were
convinced that northern hostility to slavery precluded a union that would promote [Southern]
economic, political, and international objectives.”
Finally, Northern interests might have accepted the establishment of an independent
Southern Confederacy. Assuming that the Confederacy would have no territorial ambitions
beyond the borders of the eleven secessionist states, such a peaceful dissolution of the Union
would have allowed Northern interests to implement their free-soil policy in the territories.
But, the fervent opposition of Southern interests to the exclusion of slavery from the terri-
tories belies this assumption. As Roger Ransom (1989, page 167) emphasizes, “The South
of the mid-nineteenth century was an expansionist system that coveted land to the west and
to the south...If they gained status as an independent nation, slave owners would be free
to pursue a ‘foreign policy’ just as inimical to the North’s interests as that pursued by the
‘slave power’ when it had control of the federal government within the union.” And, an inde-
pendent Confederacy, unconstrained by the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution,
would have had enhanced strategic advantages, including, for example, the ability to control
access to the sea via the Mississippi River. Fogel (1989, page 416) argues that acceptance
of an independent Southern Confederacy would only have postponed a war over slavery and
its expansion and “that the delay would have created circumstances far more favorable to a
southern victory.”4
4Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco (2001) analyze the optimality of including secession rules in the
constitution of a federal union. They consider a potential dispute over the value of the federal union. In their
analysis, in contrast to the present analysis of the dispute over the expansion of slavery, secession resolves
the dispute.
5A Model of the Dispute over Slavery
The inability of Northern and Southern interests to fashion a new constitutional com-
promise suggests that the dispute over slavery resulted in secession and war in 1861 not
only because compromises based on existing constitutional arrangements broke down, but
also, and more importantly, because peaceful resolution of the dispute over slavery no longer
provided a viable alternative to civil conﬂict. What fundamental factors made civil conﬂict,
which was avoided before the election of 1860, unavoidable in 1861? To answer this ques-
tion consider the following model of the dispute over slavery. Analysis of this model also
will suggest some general conclusions about the conditions under which a constitutionally
established political process can provide a peaceful alternative to civil conﬂict for settling
disputes between constituent groups of a polity.5
Let N denote Northern interests, let S denote Southern interests, and let X, X ∈ [0,1],
denote the outcome of the dispute over slavery. Assume that N prefers X to be larger,
whereas S prefers X to be smaller. For example, X equal to one can represent the free-soil
policy that Northern interests favored, and that Southerners saw as leading to destruction
of the wealth of slave owners, and X equal to zero can represent a policy of unrestricted
property rights for slave owners, without geographical limitations, that Southern interests
favored. Intermediate values of X can represent a more moderate set of policies, which might
include modest geographical limitations on the property rights of slave owners and/or the
5Other authors, such as Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2001) and Adam Przeworski (1991,
2001), who have analyzed the viability of constitutionally established political processes have looked at
civil conﬂict as a mechanism for switching between democratic and nondemocratic constitutions. In other
related literature Avinash Dixit, Gene Grossman, and Faruk Gul (2000), who generalize the seminal work
of Alberto Alesina (1988), pose as alternatives a constitution that speciﬁes limits on the prerogatives of the
party in power and a constitution without such limits. These authors implicitly assume that both of these
constitutions would be viable. Importantly, none of these contributions view a constitution and civil conﬂict
to be alternative methods for settling disputes, as in the present paper.
6possibility of voluntary emancipation with compensation to slave owners.6
To implement the diﬀerence in the preferences of N and S as simply as possible, assume
that the utility of N depends on X according to the additive term ANX, AN ∈ (0,∞), and
that the utility of S depends on X according to the additive term AS(1−X),A S ∈ (0,∞).
The preference parameters, AN and AS, are weights that calibrate the importance of
dispute for N and S. Assume that AN and AS are common knowledge.
Consider a constitution that prescribes an electoral contest, the winner of which, either
N or S, gets to set X. The constitution also places limits on the prerogatives of the winner.
One of these limits is that the winner not set X larger than XN. If XN is smaller than one,
then this limit is a binding constraint on N in the event that N wins the electoral contest.7
Either the nature of electoral contests and the prerogatives of winners of electoral contests
can be themselves the subject of the constitution, or they can be derived from general
principles expressed in the constitution. In addition, these components, or the general
principles from which they are derived, can be embodied either in explicit provisions of
the constitution or in implicit understandings.
Abide or Abrogate?
Constituent groups of a polity cannot commit themselves to abide by a constitution.
Hence, a constitutionally established political process provides a viable alternative to civil
conﬂict only if the constituent groups voluntarily choose to accept the outcome of this
process, including the prescribed limit on the prerogatives of the winner. In other words a
6T h eo u t c o m eo ft h eC i v i lW a rw a sX equal to one, and this outcome permanently settled the dispute
over slavery. In contrast, some disputes between constituent groups of a polity, such as disputes over the
distribution of current income, are not amenable to being settled permanently. Such recurring disputes
involve repeated interaction between the parties to the dispute. See Herschel Grossman (2003) for an
analysis of the possibility of constitutional resolution of recurring disputes.
7Constitutional limits on the prerogatives of the winner also could impose a binding constraint on S in
the event that S wins an electoral contest, but XN i st h er e l e v a n tc o n s t r a i n ti nt h ep r e s e n tc o n t e x t .
7constitution works only if it is self enforcing.8
Under what conﬁgurations of exogenous parameters is it possible to design a constitution
that is self enforcing? Suppose that an electoral contest as prescribed by a constitution takes
place and that N is the winner. Given that the constitution allows N to set X, but imposes
a binding constraint on this prerogative, ﬁrst S and then N have to decide whether to abide
by the constitution or to abrogate the constitution. A constitution is self enforcing only (1)
if S will choose to abide by the constitution if S expects N to abide by the constitution, and
(2) if N will choose to abide by the constitution if S is abiding by the constitution.
Consider the choice that S faces as the loser of the electoral contest. Either S can abide by
the constitution, accept the results of the election, and allow N to exercise its constitutional
prerogative to set X, or S can refuse to accept the results of the election, abrogate the
constitution, and launch a civil conﬂi c ti na na t t e m p tt op r e v e n tN from setting X.
Assume that S would abide by the constitution if and only if the expected utility of
S from abiding by the constitution would be at least as large as the expected utility of S
from abrogating the constitution. To determine the expected utility of S from abrogating
the constitution, let N have probability Q, and, hence, let S have probability 1 − Q, of
winning a civil conﬂict. Assume that these probabilities are common knowledge.9 Also,
assume that, if S were to abrogate the constitution and to win the ensuing civil conﬂict,
then S would set X equal to zero, its most preferred value. Alternatively, if N were to win
the ensuing civil conﬂict, then N would set X equal to one, its most preferred value.
8In focusing on the inability to make binding commitments to abide by a constitution this model abstracts
from other possible reasons for the nonexistence of viable alternatives to civil conﬂict. As explained by James
Fearon (1996) these reasons include the existence of private information about the consequences of conﬂict
and limited divisibility of the issues that are subject to dispute. The present model assumes that both parties
have the same information and that the outcome of the issue of slavery is a continuous variable.
9An interesting extension of the model would be to endogenize Q, as in papers like Dmitriy Gershenson
and Herschel Grossman (2000) and Grossman (1999) that focus on the decision to allocate resources to civil
conﬂict.
8Finally, let the positive numbers, CN and CS, which are calibrated in units of utility,
denote the expected costs of a civil conﬂict to N and S respectively. These costs include
the allocation of scarce resources to arming and to other conﬂictual activities and, if conﬂict
escalates beyond the threat of the use of force, the possible destruction of scarce resources
and loss of life.10 Assume that CN and CS are exogenous and common knowledge.11
Given these assumptions, if S, the loser of the electoral contest, expects the winner, N,
to abide by the constitution, then S would choose to abide by the constitution if and only
if XN is small enough to satisfy the following condition:
(1) AS (1 − XN) ≥ AS (1 − Q) − CS.
The LHS of condition (1) is the expected utility of S from abiding by the constitution given
that S expects N to abide by the constitution and to set X equal to XN. The RHS of
condition (1) is the expected utility of S from abrogating the constitution. In the ensuing
civil conﬂict S would expect to realize X equal to one with probability Q and X equal to
zero with probability 1 − Q, and to incur the cost CS. Condition (1) is equivalent to
ASXN ≤ ASQ + CS. Importantly, if AS becomes larger, then condition (1) requires that
XN be smaller.12
Now consider N, the winner of the electoral contest. If S does not abrogate the consti-
tution, then N can exercise its constitutional prerogative to set X. In choosing X, either
N can abide by the limitation that it will not set X larger than XN or N can behave
10The model abstracts from risk aversion. If N and S were risk averse, then a civil conﬂict would be more
costly because its outcome would be probabilistic.
11For simplicity the model assumes that CN and CS do not depend on AN and AS. Assuming instead
that CN and CS increase with AN and AS would not change the qualitative implications of the model as
long as the ratios, CN/AN and CS/AS, are not constants.
12We might suppose that, because N prefers X to be larger, if XN satisﬁes condition (1), then it satisﬁes
condition (1) as an equality. The conclusions derived below do not depend on whether condition (1) is
satisﬁed as an inequality or as an equality.
9opportunistically, disregard this limitation, and thereby abrogate the constitution.
Assume that N will abide by the limit on its constitutional prerogative if and only if the
utility of N from setting X equal to XN is at least as large as the expected utility of N
from setting X equal to one, which is its best opportunistic choice. The expected utility of
N from setting X equal to one, in turn, depends on how S would react. Assume that, if N
were to set X equal to one, then either S can acquiesce or S c a nl a u n c hac i v i lc o n ﬂict in
an attempt to force a decrease in X.
Of course, once N has set X equal to one, this outcome might not be fully reversible. For
example, once N has implemented a free-soil policy, or even more radical restrictions on the
property rights of slave owners, and slaves had begun to take advantage of these restrictions,
reestablishing the unrestricted property rights of slave owners would pose obvious diﬃculties.
To allow for the imperfect reversibility of X, assume that, if, following N having set X
equal to one, S were to launch and to win a civil conﬂict, then S would be able to decrease
X to ˆ X, ˆ X ∈ [0,1], whereas, if N were to win the civil conﬂict, then N would be able to
keep X equal to one. According to this formulation the smaller is ˆ X t h em o r er e v e r s i b l e
would be a decision by N to set X equal to one. Assume further that, if N were to set X
equal to one, then S would launch a civil conﬂict in an attempt to force a decrease in X if
and only if the expected utility of S from a civil conﬂict would be larger than the utility of
S from X being equal to one.
Given these assumptions, if N were to set X equal to one, then S would launch a civil
conﬂict in an attempt to force a decrease in X if and only if the conﬁguration of exogenous
parameters satisﬁes
(2) AS (1 − Q)( 1− ˆ X) − CS > 0.
The LHS of condition (2) is the expected utility of S from a civil conﬂict that, if S were to
win, would result in X equal to ˆ X, but which, if N were to win, would result in X equal to
one. The RHS of condition (2), which is zero, is the utility of S from X being equal to one.
10If S would acquiesce if N were to set X equal to one – that is, if the parameters do
not satisfy condition (2) – then N, having won the electoral contest, would abrogate the
constitution and set X equal to one. Alternatively, suppose that S would react to N setting
X equal to one by launching a civil conﬂict – that is, suppose that the parameters satisfy
condition (2). In that case, given that S has not abrogated the constitution, N would
choose to abide by the constitution if and only if XN is large enough to satisfy the following
condition:
(3) AN XN ≥ AN [Q +( 1− Q) ˆ X] − CN.
The LHS of condition (3) is the utility of N from abiding by the constitution and setting
X equal to XN, given that S is abiding by the constitution. The RHS of condition (3) is the
expected utility of N from abrogating the constitution, if S would react by launching a civil
conﬂict. In the ensuing civil conﬂict N expects to realize X equal to one with probability
Q and X equal to ˆ X with probability 1 − Q, and to incur the cost CN. Importantly, if AN
becomes larger, then condition (3) requires that XN be larger.
Is a Self-Enforcing Constitution Possible?
Taken together conditions (1), (2), and (3) imply the following proposition:
If and only if the conﬁguration of exogenous parameters satisﬁes con-
dition (2), then, when N wins an electoral contest, values of XN that
satisfy both condition (1) and condition (3) would be consistent with
both N and S abiding by the constitution. In addition, if and only if
the conﬁguration of exogenous parameters satisﬁes
(4) CN /AN + CS/AS > (1 − Q) ˆ X,
then the set of values of XN that satisfy both condition (1) and
condition (3) is not empty. Hence, if and only if the conﬁguration of
11exogenous parameters satisﬁes both condition (2) and condition (4),
then it is possible to design a self-enforcing constitution that, when N
wins an electoral contest, would settle the dispute between N and S
without civil conﬂict.
This proposition implies that the following properties of the exogenous parameters would
help to make constitutional resolution of disputes a viable alternative to civil conﬂict:
• The ratio CN/AN, which calibrates for N the expected cost of a civil conﬂict relative
to the importance of the dispute, should be large. A large value of CN/AN would
deter N from abrogating the constitution and provoking a civil conﬂict.
• The ratio CS/AS, which calibrates for S the expected cost of a civil conﬂict relative
to the importance of dispute should be neither too small nor too large. A not too
small value of CS/AS would deter S from abrogating the constitution, but a not too
large value of CS/AS would encourage S to launch a civil conﬂi c ti nr e a c t i o nt oa n
abrogation by N, a threat that would deter N from abrogating the constitution.
• The probability Q should be neither too small nor too large. This property means that
neither N nor S should have a big advantage in civil conﬂict. A not too small value
of Q would deter S from abrogating the constitution, but a not too large value of Q
would encourage S to launch a civil conﬂi c ti nr e a c t i o nt oa na b r o g a t i o nb yN.
• The measure of reversibility, ˆ X, should be small, implying high reversibility. High
reversibility would encourage S to launch a civil conﬂi c ti nr e a c t i o nt oa na b r o g a t i o n
by N and would deter N from abrogating the constitution by making it costly for N
if S were to win an ensuing civil conﬂict.
The observation that a large value of CN/AN and a not too small value of CS/AS help to
make a self-enforcing constitution possible is especially interesting because it conveys both
12good news and bad news. The good news is that, given the importance of the dispute, if civil
conﬂict would have large costs, especially for N as the winner of the electoral contest, and
if the N and S anticipate these large costs, then civil conﬂict is avoidable. The bad news is
that, given the expected costs of civil conﬂict, if the outcome of the dispute is suﬃciently
important, again especially for N, then civil conﬂict is unavoidable.
Why Was Civil Conﬂict Unavoidable?
Given that Northern interests had become politically dominant under the existing con-
stitution, as evidenced by the outcome of the battle over statehood for Kansas and the
presidential election of 1860, and that Northerni n t e r e s t sw o u l dh a v er e m a i n e dp o l i t i c a l l y
dominant under any conceivable alternative constitution, continued peaceful resolution of
the dispute over slavery would have required that Northern and Southern interests agree on
a self-enforcing limitation of the prerogatives of Northern interests in choosing the outcome
of the dispute. To account for the inability of Northern and Southern interests to reach such
a constitutional compromise our model directs us to historical scholarship that ﬁnds that in
the years leading up to 1861 the outcome of the dispute over slavery increased in importance
for both Northern and Southern interests. This ﬁnding suggests that by 1861 the dispute
was too important to be settled by a constitutionally established political process and, hence,
too important for civil conﬂict to be avoided. In terms of our model historical scholarship
suggests that by 1861 AN and AS had become too large to satisfy condition (4).
Fogel’s account of northern ante-bellum politics suggests a plausible story that is consis-
t e n tw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nAN. From the late 1840s, mainly because of increased immigration,
incomes and living conditions of native, northern, non-farm workers became increasingly
depressed. Fogel (1989, page 356) tells us that this depression of living conditions was “one
of the most severe and protracted economic and social catastrophes of American history.”
As a consequence of this working-class depression land policy became increasingly impor-
tant. Free homesteads, opening western lands for settlement by the working poor, became a
13paramount demand of northern labor. But, the objective of Southern interests that western
territories be opened to slavery stood in the way of free homesteads. Thus, as Fogel (1989,
page 350) explains, land policy “drew into direct conﬂict with Slave Power the northern
working-class leaders who had previously remained aloof from the anti-slavery movement.”
The result was the coalescing of free-soil proponents and nativist factions into the new Re-
publican Party and a new unwillingness of Northern interests to compromise in the dispute
over slavery.
In addition, the evidence about the economics of slavery, as summarized by Fogel (1989)
and Ransom (1989), suggests a plausible reason for an increase in AS in the years leading up
to 1861. According to Fogel (1989, page 412), “From the mid-1840s on...the slave economy
of the South was vigorous and growing rapidly. Whatever the pessimism of [slave owners]
during the economic crises of 1826-1831 and 1840-1845, during the last half of the 1840s
and most of the 1850s they foresaw a continuation of their prosperity and, save for the
political threat from the North, numerous opportunities for its expansion. The main thrust
of cliometric research has demonstrated that this economic optimism was well founded...”
As Ransom (1989, page 47) puts it, “On the eve of the Civil War, American slaveholders
were coming oﬀ a decade and a half of exuberant growth and expansion.”
As it turned out, the actual costs to both Northern interests and Southern interests of
the ensuing civil conﬂict, including six hundred thousand men killed and thousands more
maimed, certainly were larger than the expected costs, CN and CS. We can speculate
whether, if both Northern interests and Southern interests had not underestimated the costs
of the ensuing civil conﬂict, the perceived conﬁguration of exogenous parameters still would
have failed to satisfy condition (4), even with the increased importance of the dispute, as
reﬂe c t e di ni n c r e a s e dv a l u e so f AN and AS. But, it is only hindsight that suggests that the
negotiation of a new constitutional compromise would have been better for both Northern
interests and Southern interests than the actual consequences of the civil conﬂict. In the
event, the Civil War settled the dispute.
14Summary
This paper has combined theoretical and historical analysis to propose an answer to
the question of why in 1861, after seventy years of artful compromises that enabled the
dispute over slavery to be settled peacefully, civil conﬂict became unavoidable. This answer
goes beyond a description of the breakdown of compromises based on existing constitutional
arrangements and attempts to explain why all of the many attempts to negotiate a new
constitutional compromise failed.
The salient theoretical ﬁn d i n gw a st h a t ,i ft h eo u t c o m eo fad i s p u t ei ss u ﬃciently im-
portant relative to the expected costs of civil conﬂict, then a constitutional compromise,
which would have to include a self-enforcing limitation on the prerogatives of the winner of
electoral contests, is not possible. The salient historical observation was that, as a result of
developments in the years leading up to 1861 the outcome of the dispute over slavery had
become increasingly important to both Northern and Southern interests. In addition, both
Northern and Southern interests apparently underestimated the costs of civil conﬂict.
The paper concludes that secession and war were unavoidable because the dispute over
slavery had become too important to both Northern and Southern interests to be settled
peacefully. This event exempliﬁes the theoretical proposition that, if the constituent groups
of a polity are deeply divided and, as a result, are unable to agree on meaningful and self-
enforcing limitations on the prerogatives of winners of electoral contests, then civil conﬂict
can be unavoidable.
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